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JoHm E. HALL=N*
Radio and television play an important part in American life
today. Nowhere is this part greater than in political campaigns
where the speakers may have an audience in the millions. A speak-
er is of course responsible for what he says, and if he makes any
defamatory and false statements, he is subject to the ordinary rules
of slander and libel. If the statement is made over the radio,' the
defamed individual's reputation is hurt in the estimation of a much
larger group of people than would be the case if the statement were
made elsewhere. Since the radio station made this increased damage
possible by furnishing its facilities to the speaker, one solution
would be to hold the station liable in defamation. If this were ac-
cepted, the next question would be whether the station could pro-
tect itself by prohibiting the utterance of defamatory remarks. In
most instances this would take care of the interests of the station,
but many think that it would involve an undue restriction upon the
right of free speech. It may be a close question as to whether state-
ments are defamatory or not and it may not be good policy to leave
such issues to the judgment of the station owner. But if he can be
held liable for defamatory remarks, and if he cannot control what
is said over the station, he is on the horns of a dilemma.
The Federal Communications Act provides:
SEC. 315 (a). If any licensee shall permit any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use
a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all such other candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, that such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material broad-
cast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is
hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its
station by any such candidate.
The statute originated as Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927,
and was taken over verbatim in the Communications Act of 1934.
As indicated in the note, no material change was made in this
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1 The term "radio," as used in this discussion, includes television. The
new Ohio statute deals with the liability of "the owner, licensee, or operator
of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station."
LIABILITY OF BROADCASTERS
section in 1952.2
A leading case in the early days of radio construed this section
of the radio act and held that "the prohibition of censorship of
material broadcast over the radio station of a licensee merely pre-
vents the licensee from censoring the words as to their political
and partisan trend but does not give a licensee any privilege to
join and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant any immunity
from the consequences of such action. The federal radio act confers
no privilege to broadcasting stations to publish defamatory utter-
ances."13
As a result of this approach many stations censored political
speeches and many complaints to the Federal Communications
Commission turned on the question whether the statements in the
script were libelous. 4 Finally, in a case involving the renewal of
a broadcasting license, the commission said: "The case raises
squarely one of the most crucial problems with respect to political
broadcasts under Section 315 of the act, namely, whether or not
the provision of the section denying the licensee the right to censor
the 'material' of a broadcast within the meaning of Section 315
prohibits the station from censoring or deleting material in radio
speeches by candidates for public office which they might reason-
ably believe to be libelous or to subject their station to an action for
damages." The commission said the legislative history of Section 315
makes it clear that Congress did not intend licensees to have any
right of censorship over political broadcasts, and held that "the
censorship prohibited under Section 315 of the Communications
Act includes the refusal to broadcast a speech or part of a speech
by a candidate for public office because of the allegedly libelous
or slanderous content of the speech." 5
The commission was not impressed by the argument that its
holding would subject the station to liability for defamation be-
cause it construed Section 315 as indicating an occupation of the
field by federal authority which would relieve the owner of any
2 PuB. L. 554 (1952) amending the Communications Act of 1934. There
is no change in the original act as far as this paragraph is concerned except
that the earlier act contained the words "and the Commission shall make
rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect" after "broadcasting
station" in the middle of the paragraph. Such a statement is made in 315(c)
of the recent act.
3 Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
4
"This is a question which has proved to be perplexing over the years
to Congress, the Commission, and the broadcasters themselves. **** Most of
the complaints received by the Commission concerning alleged violations of
Section 315 concern instances in which the station has insisted on the deletion
of matter which it alleged might subject the station to suits for damages."
In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1072 (1948).
SIn re Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
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liability in defamation regardless of state laws. This confidence
was not shared by everybody, and bills were introduced in many
legislatures to protect the station owner from liability for defama-
tion in such situations. While there was some statutory support
before this case was decided, most of the laws were enacted in the
sessions of 1949 and 1951.
Section 2739.02 (A), newly enacted by the Ohio Legislature,
provides that "the owner, licensee, or operator of a visual or sound
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, shall not be liable
for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the
facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of any candi-
date for public office where such statement is not subject to censor-
ship or control by reason of any federal statute or any ruling or
order of the Federal Communications Commission made pursuant
thereto" but that it shall not apply if the owner is a candidate or
speaker on behalf of a candidate.
Several states now have similar statutes, 6 while others provide:
"In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or operator *****-
be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement utter-
ed over the facilities of such station or network by or on behalf
of any candidate for public office."
Of course, the speaker is liable for defamatory remarks over
the radio, whether he is himself a candidate, or speaking on behalf
of one. But the station or the network whose facilities make pos-
sible the carrying of the remarks to millions is excused. It would
seem unfair to hold the station if it were compelled to carry these
remarks. If the Port Huron case is correctly decided, the statutes
follow as a natural corollary.8 In that case the commission was
forced to choose between the advantages of free speech, with the
public being permitted to hear over the radio what the candidates
wanted to bring before them on the one hand, and the possible
loss to an innocent station owner, or an increased damage to the
individual attacked on the other. The holding of the Commission
that the station owner could not delete the words of the speaker
is certainly in accord with the specific language of § 315 (a) "such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broad-
cast." But its constitutionality may yet be tested by the courts.
6 AMong these are Maine, C.134, R.S. 117, 31A; Maryland, Art. 75, 19A;
Michigan § 27.1405; Missouri § 537.105; South Carolina Act No. 773 of 1952
S.C. Acts.
7 For instance, Georgia § 105-713; Nebraska § 86-602; Louisiana § 45-
1352; Wyoming § 3-8204.
8 There may be some question as to how complete a protection these
state statutes are. For, as said by Chief Justice Hughes twenty years ago,
"No state lines divide the radio waves and national regulation is not only
appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio facilities." Federal
Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933).
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The next paragraph of the new Ohio act is not limited to po-
litical broadcasts. It applies to anything said over the air. Section
315 (a) is not applicable here and there is nothing to prevent the
operator from deleting matters from prepared scripts if he considers
it objectionable. A conflict has arisen in other states as to the
extent of liability of the operator, and paragraph B of the Ohio
Statute, as well as similar statutes in other states, attempts to
resolve that common law problem.
Defamation is an absolute tort. It is not dependent upon negli-
gence. Publishers of newspapers are generally held liable for defam-
atory statements although there was no intent to defame the plain-
tiff and no knowledge that the communication was or could be
understood to be defamatory.9 The same rule has been applied to
radio stations.'0 But because operators of such stations have more
difficulty in controlling everything that is said over the air, some
courts have refused to hold them liable in the absence of negli-
gence."' The Restatement of Torts has failed to take any position
on this issue. 12
A considerable number of states now have statutes holding
the operator of a radio station not liable for defamatory statements
uttered by others, "unless it shall be alleged and proved by the
complaining party that such owner **** has failed to exercise due
care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in
such broadcast."' 3 A somewhat smaller number of states place the
burden of showing freedom from negligence upon the owner or
operator of a radio station.14 The new Ohio statute is in accord with
the latter group. It provides:
"(B) The owner, licensee, or operator shall not be liable for
any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered
in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast by one other
than such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof,
9 Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspaper, 2 K.B. 331 (1929); Petransky v. Re-
pository Printing Co., 51 Ohio App. 306, 200 N.E. 647 (1935).
10 Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82; Coffey v. Midland Broad-
casting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (1934).
11 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 8A.2d 302
(1939); Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A. 2d 143 (1948).
1Z SEc. 577, CAVEAT: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether
the proprietors of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from liability
for a defamatory broadcast by a person not in their employ if they could
not have prevented the publication by the exercise of reasonable care, or
whether, as an original publisher, they are liable irrespective of the pre-
cautions taken to prevent the defamatory publication."
13 Among these are Georgia, § 105-712; Kansas, § 60-746a; Michigan, §
27.1405; Nebraska, § 86-601.
14For example, Iowa § 659.5; Maine, C. 134, R. S. 117, 31A; Minnesota, §
544.043.
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if it shall be proved by such owner, licensee or operator, that he
exercised reasonable care to prevent the publication or utterance
of such statement in such broadcast."
Placing the burden of proof upon the defendant might have
raised serious constitutional questions a generation ago.15 But such
a practice is not uncommon today.1
The new Ohio act has been numbered 2739.03 and so it will
appear in the Revised Code after 2739.01 and 2739.02 (formerly
11341 and 11342). The first of these sections deals with the re-
quirements of an action for libel or slander, and the second with
defenses to libel and slander. There has been considerable diffi-
culty in determining which tort is involved in statements over the
radio. Under the old distinction that libel is what is seen, and
slander is what is heard, the latter would seem to be more appli-
cable.17 But since libel is regarded as the more serious of the two,
some courts have felt that the wide dissemination given such re-
marks should lead to a stricter responsibility.18 The distinction has
also been made to turn upon whether the remarks were extempo-
raneous or read from a script.'9 A few Western states20 attempted
to solve the problem by legislation, but were as far from agreement
as the cases. The framers of § 2739.03 cannot be accused of rushing
into this difficulty. The new act provides that the owners, licensees
or operators shall not be liable for certain "defamatory" statements,
an adjective that obviously includes both libelous and slanderous
remarks.
In 1913 a law was enacted which provided that if a newspaper
company printed any false statement about an individual or organi-
zation, it should upon the demand of the aggrieved person, print
the truth concerning such statements which the person might offer
to it.21 This and allied topics became Section 6319 of the Revised
Statutes under the heading, "Newspapers." The 1953 revision of the
statutes has transferred the subject matter to the field of slander
IS Cf. Byers v. The Meridian Printing Co., 84 Ohio St. 408 (1911).
16 Cf. Securities Act, 15 U.S.CA. § 77a et seq.
17 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188; Remington v. Bent-
ley, 88 Fed. Supp. 166 (1949) (extemporaneous remark on television); Mel-
drum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Vict. L. R. 425 (1932).
18 Cf. Restatement of Torts § 568(3) "The area of dissemination, the de-
liberate and premeditated character of the publication, and the persistence
of the defamatory conduct are factors to be considered in determining whether
a publication is a libel rather than a slander"; Sorenson v. Wood, note 3,
aiupra.
19 Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E. 2d 30 (1947); 9 OHIo ST.
L. J. 179.20California, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington.
21103 v. 854.
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and libel, so that § 6319-3 has become § 2739.13. The new radio act
imposes the same duty upon broadcasting stations as § 2739.13 does
upon newspapers, and in fact § 2739.03 (C) is almost identical with
§ 2739.13 except for the substitution of broadcasting station for
newspaper company.
Making allowance for the difference between broadcasting
and printing we find § 2739.03 (D) very similar to § 2739.14
(6319-4). Whenever demand is made for the broadcast of a state-
ment under division (C) of this section, the station shall broadcast
the same within forty-eight hours. It shall be done without additions
or omissions in as prominent a manner and time as the original
broadcast. It shall be done without charge. It may be proved as a
mitigating circumstance to reduce damages.
The remaining paragraphs, E, F and G of § 2739.03 are com-
parable to § § 2739.15 and .16 (6319-5 and 6). Statements that sta-
tions are compelled to broadcast must be sworn to, and false swear-
ing is punishable. The station is not liable for anything in such
a statement. The station shall not refuse or fail to broadcast any
true statement as required by division (C). Any person responsible
for refusing to broadcast as required shall be fined. The prose-
cuting attorney shall investigate complaints and upon reasonable
cause shall prosecute offenders. The penalties are now grouped
in § 2739.99, paragraph F being added there to provide for violations
of 2739.03.
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